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Conflicts between police and citizens in recent years have achieved
increasing notoriety, bringing into prominence the legal problems sur-
rounding the crime of obstructing an officer or resisting arrest.' On the
one hand, obstructive tactics such as "going limp" have become a
common occurrence in political demonstrations; on the other, police
sometimes use resisting arrest and similar charges to "cover" errors-
including false arrests and the use of excessive force-made during
street demonstrations and in individual confrontations.2 As the charge
of resisting an officer has become more common, the right to resist un-
lawfully exercised authority has become part of the passionate political
conflict over "law and order."3
Last year, Wainwright v. New Orleans4 presented the Supreme Court
with the issue of a citizen's right to resist unwarranted and unlawful
police action. The New Orleans police stopped Wainwright, a Tulane
law student, allegedly for questioning concerning a murder. When he
refused to submit to a search, he was taken into custody and forcibly
searched at a police station. Ultimately, he was charged with resisting
an officer and breach of the peace by assaulting an officer, charges which
arose from his conduct in the police station. The Supreme Court con-
t Staff Attorney, New York Civil Liberties Union. B.A. 1957, Yale University, LL.B.
1960, Harvard University.
1. A typically general statutory provision is that of the N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05
(McKinney 1967):
A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when lie intentionally
obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental func.
tion or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any
independently unlawful act. Obstructing governmental administration is a class A
misdemeanor.
Resisting arrest is separately defined in §§ 120.05 and 205.30. The crime of assaulting
an officer includes elements which may be part of the charge of obstructing or resisting
an officer, the chief difference being that "obstruction" is made out by a mere refusal to"go quietly" after an arrest, while assault requires an active touching. Other possible
charges arising out of conflicts with the police are disorderly conduct, People v. Tiuston,
6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957), and even rioting, Commonwealth v.
Crotty, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403 (1865).
2. PRES. COIMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. TASK FORCE
REPORT ON THE POLICE 182, 195 (1967); E. CRAY, THE Bic BLUE LINE, chs. I, IV (1966); P.
CHEvicNY, POLICE POWER, passim (1969).
3. In this article the term "right" is used only to mean justification sufficient to
reduce or remove criminal liability. It will be argued that patently illegal arrests present
such strong provocation that a citizen should not be criminally liable for reasonable
resistance.
4. 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
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sidered the breach of the peace charge and the petitioner's claim that
the charge resulted from an unlawful arrest.
The Court might have shed some light on the problem of resistance
to unlawful police action, but instead it dismissed the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted because the record was inadequate. Two
dissenting Justices, Warren and Douglas, intimated that the right to
resist an unlawful "seizure of the person" may be basic to the fourth
amendment." The Court as a whole has left the question open with the
implied caveat that the issues are serious indeed.
I. The Right at Common Law
The dissenting Justices' suggestion that there may be a right to re-
sist an unlawful arrest is consistent with a centuries-old tradition of the
common law, both in England and America." Originally, the right was
part of the right to resist any unlawful official process.7 An action by an
official in excess of his authority was a trespass that could be resisted by
physical force. The cases frequently treated the trespass as a "provo-
cation," which would justify an assault, or, if the officer were killed,
would reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.
The law was still unsettled in 1666. In Hopkin Huggett's Cases the
defendant and others had killed a constable who was illegally attempt-
ing to impress a man into the army. The judges disagreed whether the
crime was murder or manslaughter because the victim of the impress-
ment apparently offered no resistance, but the majority said
that if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his liberty by
three men, altho' he be quiet himself, and do not endeavor any
rescue, yet this is a provocation to all other men of England, not
only his friends but strangers also for common humanity sake, as
my Lord Bridgman said, to endeavor his rescue.0
The Queen v. Tooley"° firmly established the right to resist an unlawful
arrest. A constable tried to arrest one Anne Dekins either because she
5. Justice Warren thought that Wainwright's arrest was clearly illegal, but lie felt
that the Supreme Court did not need to reach the problem of the petitioner's constitu-
tional right to resist because Louisiana law explicitly gave him sud a right. See City of
Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 974, 14 So. 2d 781 (1943).
6. See 4 Am. JuR. Arrest § 92 (1936); 5 Am. JuL 2D Arrest § 93 (1962); J. TR. N, I
Russ.L ON CRMIE 511 et seq. (11th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as TunNER].
7. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1146 (1966).
8. 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
9. Id.
10. 2 Ld. Raym. 1297, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
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was suspected of being disorderly or had been disorderly at some time
in the past, though she was not disorderly at the time she was arrested.
The defendants interfered in the arrest, killing the constable. The
charge of murder was reduced to manslaughter because:
[A] man ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the laws, and
if anyone against the law imprison a man, he is an offender against
Magna Charta. We seven hold this to be sufficient provocation, and
we have good authority for it: in Hopkin Huggett's case... (and
the case is stronger than that)."
In applying this rationale to cases of assault, the English judges ruled
that the provocation of an unlawful arrest did not simply reduce the
degree of the crime, as it did in the case of homicide, but rather excused
the assault altogether.' 2 For example, the courts excused an assault on a
constable who attempted to arrest a journeyman because his master
"suspected that he had tools of his, and was leaving his work undone,"'8
and an assault on a constable who sought to arrest a man for "insulting"
a third-party complainant.' 4 Such cases present instances of obviously
unlawful arrests in which there was not only no probable cause, but
apparently no offense at all.
The courts had no problems in such cases because there was clear
provocation, but cases involving mere technical defects in the arrest
were another matter. In The King v. Mead,'5 a conviction for assault-
ing a bailiff with an axe was reversed because the bailiff had not law-
fully arrested the defendant; he had shown a proper warrant, but not
the underlying writ.
But English authorities eventually recognized that resistance should
not be excused in cases like Mead where there was no real provocation.
The judges in The Queen v. Davis 6 finally held that the Tooley
decision did not require a finding of provocation as a matter of law in
11. 92 Eng. Rep. at 352.
12. In California it has been held recently that a statute abolishing the common law
right to resist an unlawful arrest may have the effect merely of reducing the degree of
crime for assaulting an officer from a felony to a misdemeanor. See People v. Curtis,
- Cal. -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33 (1969).
13. The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
14. The King v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826). In this case and in The
King v. Thompson, supra note 13, the defendant resisted with a deadly weapon, which
would not be justifiable under later English law. See 1 TuRER, supra note 6, at 511; The
Queen v. Wilson, 1 W.L.R. 493 (1955).
15. 2 Stark. 205 (1817). See also The King v. Patience, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (1837), In
which the defendant resisted a warrant executed by the constable's son.
16. 1 Leigh g- Cave's C.C. Res. 64 (Camarthen Assizes 1861). The debate among the
English commentators is traced in I TURNER, supra note 6, at 508-511.
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every case where there was an illegal arrest. Davis was charged with the
murder of a constable who was executing a warrant which contained
only some highly technical defects. Justice Blackburn said:
This principle seems the one recognized in Roger's case... ; where
it was ruled by Lord Hardwicke that, provided the process be not
defective in the frame of it, and be issued by a Court or magis-
trate having jurisdiction in the case, the killing of a minister of
justice in the execution of it will be murder, although there may
have been error or irregularity in the proceeding previous to issu-
ing the process; for the officer must at his peril pay obedience to it.17
Further criticism and analysis of the early common law rule led to other
modifications. It was held, for example, that resistance which occurred
some time after the arrest was unjustified, partly because the provoca-
tion was reduced once the defendant had time to reflect. 8
The English courts thus arrived at certain basic distinctions essential
to an understanding of the law of resistance to unlawful official action.
A legal process which is valid "on its face" must be obeyed, but one
that is patently unlawful is such a provocation to the citizen that the
criminal element in his resistance is reduced, if not removed entirely.
The distinction is sometimes a difficult one to apply, but it is a useful
guide. Any "provocation" to the defendant in Davis, where the warrant
contained only minor defects, is doubtful. In most of the cases in which
provocation was recognized, however, the arrests were of the most out-
rageous kind: impressment of a soldier,'0 arrest on suspicion of being
disorderly,20 arrest for refusal to finish work,2' or arrest on suspicion of
making an insult.22 The arrests were simply arbitrary assertions of au-
thority, and the English courts felt that a free man should not be pe-
nalized for resisting such affronts.
American courts adopted the English rule that unlawful arrest was
a provocation to resist, although, as in England, many of the older cases
tended to define any defect in the process as a provocation. Other courts
attempted to limit lawful resistance to legal processes that were "bad on
17. 1 Leigh & Cave's C.C. Res. at 75.
18. 1 TuaRsER 508. Accord, People v. McNeil, 15 N.Y.2d 717, 256 N.YS.2d 614, 204
N.E.2d 648 (1965).
19. Hopkin Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
20. The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Ra)m. 1297, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
21. The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
22. The King v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826). It is perhaps significant that
in all these cases the existence of any underlying offense was doubtful. In at least two
of them, the impressment and the arrest of the journeyman, there was an element of
sodal oppression which may have increased the provocation.
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their face," with illogical results. 2 3 Some courts, however, adopted the
more rational rule that evolved from the English cases. In the nine-
teenth century, federal judges attempted a rough differentiation be-
tween legal process that was apparently regular and that which was
patently arbitrary. Two cases from the District of Columbia Circuit
exemplify the American law. The defendant in United States v.
Thompson 24 was charged with assault and battery on a marshal at-
tempting to execute a warrant. The warrant was void because the
justice had signed it in pencil and because the act charged had been
committed outside the justice's territorial jurisdiction, although this
was not apparent on the warrant's face. There seems to have been no
question but that the underlying offense, beating a slave, was in fact
committed. The court held that if the warrant contains on its face a
cause of arrest within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, "purports to
have been issued within his jurisdiction, and is in other respects formal,"
the officer is bound to execute it, and the defendant may not lawfully
resist.25 United States v. Goure,26 eleven years later, presents a quite
different result. The officers arrested Goure, without a warrant,
because they "believed" him to be "a loose and disorderly person
without any visible means of livehood, a nightwalker, a frequenter
of bawdy-houses and a keeper of false keys."27 When they stopped and
searched Goure, he resisted and threatened their lives. He was charged
with intimidating officers in the discharge of official duties, but the
court held that the officers were acting beyond the scope of their duties.
In the nineteenth century, both American and English courts reached
the same conclusions concerning the right to resist unlawful arrest: an
assertion of arbitrary authority was a provocation to resist. This concept
of provocation is still vital today.
II. Criticism of the Right to Resist
Of late, the common law rule has fallen into disfavor with many
lawyers for what are felt to be practical reasons. The decline of the
23. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1146 (1966). Many of the cases differed on when process
was void on its face, often with doubtful results. The New Hampshire Supreme Court,
for instance, held that an "officer will not be protected because he is acting by virtue
of papers which it is apparent from their inspection have no legal vitality." As an exam-
ple of such papers, the court cited a warrant without a seal. State v. Weed, 21 N.H. 262,
269 (1850). Cf. Wright v. Comm., 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 718, 2 S.W. 904 (Ct. App. 1887); Creighton
v. Comm., 84 Ky. 103 (1883); State v. Curtis, 2 N.C. 471 (1797). But cf. People ex rel.
Frierson v. Pate, 344 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1965).
24. 28 F. Cas. 89 (No. 16,484) (C.C.D.C. 1823).
25. Id. at 90.
26. 25 F. Cas. 1381 (No. 15,240) (C.C.D.C. 1834).
27. Id.
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common law rule dates at least from Professor Warner's attack in the
forties.28 After a spirited debate in 1958, the American Law Institute
rejected the right to resist unlawful arrest altogether:
The use of force is not justifiable ... : (1) to resist an arrest which
the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the
arrest is unlawful .... 20
The right has been abolished by the legislature in at least six states,30
most recently in New York, where the so-called "no-sock" law was
passed as a rider to a bill strengthening the right of the police to use
deadly force.31 Some state and federal judges have also condemned the
right,3 2 most recently the Second Circuit which suggested, in 1967, that
the right to resist was "waning.
' 33
Indeed, recognition of the right has waned in the face of almost uni-
versal criticism, although the increasing notoriety of police abuses
makes this development somewhat puzzling. Academic and judicial
condemnation, furthermore, has obscured the continuing vitality of
what has been the law for at least three hundred years. Critics of the
common law rule regard it as a vestige of a more brutal age when
society could tolerate street altercations between officers and citizens
and when a citizen deprived of constitutional rights had no effective
redress. Nowadays, it is argued, the rough-and-tumble social climate
that supported the right is gone. As the New Jersey Superior Court
said:
The concept of self-help is in decline. It is antisocial in an ur-
banized society. It is potentially dangerous to all involved. It is no
longer necessary because of the legal remedies available.3 4
To assert that adequate legal remedies now exist to redress false
arrests and other police abuses is to misconstrue the rationale of the
right. The right does not exist to encourage citizens to resist, but
28. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315. 330 (1942). See, e.g., Note.
The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Outdated Concept?, 3 TuLs. LJ. 40 (1963).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Reasonable ignorance of
the fact that the person making the arrest -was a peace officer would be a defense to the
charge under this section.
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West. Supp. 1968); DEL. CODE AN.% Title II. § 1905
(1951); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (Smith-Hurd 1961); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. 594.5 (1955):
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.27 (McKinney Supp. 1968); R.I. GEL,. LWs AN.. 12-7-10 (1941).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
32. The New Jersey Superior Court rejected te common-law rule in an unusual
instance of prospective decision-making. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d
428 (App. Div. 1965).
33. United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 246n. (2d Cir. 1967).
34. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super 169, 184, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (App. Div. 1963).
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rather to protect those provoked into resistance by unlawful arrests.
In the excitement of an arrest, a person is likely to respond to his
emotions, and if his impulse to resist is provoked by arbitrary police
behavior, it is fundamentally unfair to punish him for giving in to that
impulse with measured resistance.
Even were one to accept the theory that other remedies may be
substitutes for the right to resist, the rationale of the right is not
undermined unless those alternative remedies are real ones. Few critics
have examined the adequacy of the alternative remedies on which they
have relied, but a cursory overview suggests that each of them is seri-
ously deficient.
Bail. At one time bail was nearly impossible to obtain, and the
danger of fatal disease in prison was great-giving an 18th-century
defendant particular reason to fear arrest.38 Although bail is now
frequently available and incarceration does not often result in death,
the bail system still does not protect a substantial number of defen-
dants. A recent survey revealed that nearly half the defendants in a
sample of cases pending before the New York City courts remained in
jail prior to trial.3 6 Many lose their jobs as a result. And even if an
individual is released on bail, he will have been subjected to the ex-
pense of paying a bondsman and to the stigma of arrest, which, in the
case of minor offenses, may have consequences as serious as those of
conviction. When these considerations are combined with the great
delay and congestion in urban criminal courts, bail hardly seems an
adequate remedy.
Procedural safeguards. That constitutional rights are more scrupu-
lously protected now than they were in the past, according to some,
reduces the cause for resistance.37 Assuming the dubious proposition
that later procedural protections affect the thinking of persons at the
time of arrest 38 however, such protections are realizable only if the
35. Comment, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 7 NATURAL REs. L.J. 119, 123
(1967).
36. Foote, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv.
693, 707 (1968). See also R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM,
ch. II (1965).
37. For example, it has been argued that before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 343 (1961)
some defendants were motivated to resist unlawful arrest in order to prevent contraband
from being taken from their person by the arresting officer. Since such evidence would
now be excluded, that motive is said to be gone. N.Y. State Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials, Memorandum, Re: An Act to Amend the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure in Relation to the Use of Force in Resisting Arrest, Feb. 23, 1965.
In a similar vein, Professor Warner argued that only a guilty man has a motive to
resist; the innocent defendant will be eager to establish his innocence. Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, supra note 28.
38. See pp. 1136-37 infra.
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defendant has some reliable way of showing that the police acted un-
constitutionally. As recent research has shown, defendants usually
have no such proof. For example, if police search illegally and make
an arrest based on the evidence obtained thereby, policemen may
testify in such a way as to make the evidence appear to have been
lawfully seized.39 The existence of procedural safeguards is thus un-
likely to inspire the confidence necessary to eliminate the rationale of
the right to resist.
Administrative remedies. Recent studies have shown that admin-
istrative review of police abuses tends to be futile. Despite the enor-
mous clamor over police review in the last few years, it is still true
that most police departments do not have any well-developed com-
plaint procedures. They possess neither specialized staffs nor hearing
procedures for such complaints,40 and even in cities like New York,
where such procedures are long-established, most complaints are found
to be unsubstantiated for lack of corroboration.
41
Injunction. A civil injunction theoretically can reach systematic
abuses, the very ones with which administrative complaint procedures
are least able to cope. An injunction against unlawful police action
will usually not be granted, however, unless there is such a clearly
provable pattern or policy that a repetition of the abuse can be ex-
pected,' and except in the most extraordinary cases,
43 no such pattern
or policy can be proved. It is very likely that most police abuses do not
fall into patterns definite enough to be enjoined, and that most of them
are contrary to department policy.
Civil damages. A damage action is the logical remedy for the indi-
vidual abuse that is not enjoinable, but it is not a remedy that will
solve the problems of most people falsely arrested. The action may take
several years, and the plaintiff may have a difficult time finding a
39. Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seiture Practices in Narcotics
Cases, 8 COLum. J. LAv & Soc. PRoB. 87 (1968).
40. Note, Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against Police, 78 HAlt.. L. REV.
499, 504, 505 (1964). See PRES. COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMIENT AND Tim ADmsiNSTrATION OF
JusTicE, FmL SuvEY V: NATIONAL SURvEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY REi.ATio.,s 217
(1967).
41. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowER, ch. 14 (1969). Even more difficult arc cases "in uhich
the actions of the officer axe dearly illegal or improper but are consistent with prevailing
practices of a department." Prs. CoMM. ON LAw ENFORCE-IENT AND TuE ADmu. or JuscE,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE POLICE 28-29 (1967).
42. See Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Con-
duct, 78 YALE L.J. 143, 146 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 507 U.S. 496 (1939); Lankford v. Gelston. 364 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1966) (en banc).
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lawyer willing to spend the necessary time on his case unless he has
been injured badly enough to give rise to large damages.
Such are the remedies ordinarily available to the modern citizen
against a false arrest.44 They would probably not, by themselves, be
enough to induce him to accept his detention in silence. The critics
of the right to resist, quite properly, rely on more intangible consid-
erations. In contrasting the days when the right came into being with
our own enlightened times, it is said that the right is now "artificial"
or futile.45 The weapons of law enforcement today are so powerful
that the citizen can hardly hope to escape arrest-an attempt usually
leads to injury, and the citizen almost always gets the worse of it. Per-
haps most important, the legality of an arrest may be a highly technical
matter, "often a matter of close debate as to which even lawyers and
judges may differ, ' 4 ; and a citizen ought not to try to settle the question
by resistance in the street. As the court said in State v. Koonce:
[P]olice officers attempting in good faith, although mistakenly, to
perform their duties in effecting an arrest should be relieved of the
threat of physical harm at the hand of the arrestee.
47
The critics' arguments boil down to one central point: constituted
authority is now sufficiently civilized that citizens should deal with it
peacefully. Violence only encourages disrespect for law.
The argument that an arrest is a technical matter, its validity to be
settled in the courts rather than on the streets, will be extensively
analyzed in the pages that follow. The legality of some arrests is indeed
a matter of dispute, but others are obviously illegal. The question really
is whether there is a workable rule to distinguish the classes of unlaw-
ful arrests that may be resisted from other unlawful arrests.
The "futility-of-the-resistance" argument seems beside the point, in
the same way that the adequacy of the alternative remedies for police
abuse is beside the point. Surely, when obeying the impulse to resist
official abuse, most citizens do not consider the likelihood that they
will successfully avoid arrest, any more than they consider the cost in
jail time awaiting trial if they are arrested. As the Court of Appeals of
New York said in 1954:
44. Criminal proceedings against the officer are not available in the usual case because
"false arrest" is not a crime. Certain specialized types of false arrests, such as those
intended to enforce a pattern of segregation, may be federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1968).
45. Comment, 7 NATURAL Ras. L.J. 119, supra note 35, at 125. See also authorities cited
note 28 supra.
46. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 184, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (1965).
47. Id.
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For most people, an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront and
intrusion-the more offensive because under color of law-to be
resisted as energetically as a violent assault.
48
And as long ago as 1710 the King's Bench used equally strong words:
The prisoners in this case had sufficient provocation; for if one
be imprisoned upon an unlawful authority, it is a sufficient prov-
ocation to all people out of compassion, much more where it is
done under a colour of justice, and where the liberty of the sub-
ject is invaded, it is a provocation to all the subjects of England.49
The decision to resist is the work of a moment rather than the result
of carefully considered alternatives. The real question is whether for
this act of resistance the citizen ought to be convicted of a crime.
Commentators have treated the question of whether there is a right
to resist unlawful arrest as a narrowly prudential one: Are the potential
harms to the officer and citizen justified in light of the available alter-
natives? Such a formulation assumes that there is no "right" to resist.
The existence of other rights, such as the right to remain silent or to
be free from unlawful searches, does not depend upon whether it is
prudent for the individual to assert them. Such rights are preserved
because our experience has been that to ignore them encourages offi-
cial abuses. Citizens feel that a government which abuses them is
tyrannical. 50 The question is whether such a sense of injustice lies be-
hind the preservation of the right to resist.
To anyone who values his personal liberty and possesses a sense of
justice, the openly arbitrary assertion of official power is an "outrageous
affront." Anglo-American case law recognized the existence of this
affront and concluded that it justified the right to resist. To understand
the values which gave rise to the right, it is necessary to consider the
period during which the right came to be recognized in England. It
was during this period, the English revolution (1666-1710), that com-
mon citizens first began to recognize that they had rights of personal
liberty against the lords and the Crown.5 1 The right to resist unlawful
arrest memorializes one of the principal elements in the heritage of the
English revolution: the belief that the will to resist arbitrary authority
in a reasonable way is valuable and ought not to be suppressed by the
criminal law. In the face of obvious injustice, one ought not to be
48. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 508, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238. 240 (1954).
49. The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1297, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 352 (KMB. 1710).
50. See L. LE Y, ORIGINS OF = FiFm Am1xzNDNIa= passim (1967).
51. Id., chs. ix, x.
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forced to submit and swallow one's sense of justice. More importantly,
it is unconscionable to convict a man for resisting an injustice. This is
indeed a value judgment, but the values are fundamental.
III. Dimensions of the Right
The common law history and the theory of provocation imply that
conviction of a defendant for reasonable resistance to an unlawful
arrest may be a denial of due process of law. English and American
courts have sometimes relied on this constitutional dimension without
much reflection or analysis.52 There are three possible constitutional
rationales upon which the right may be based.
Vindication of constitutional rights. In a limited category of cases,
reasonable resistance may be essential to the vindication of certain con-
stitutional rights. First amendment rights, in particular, may need such
protection. The police frequently arrest political demonstrators even
though the demonstrators are acting lawfully. These arrests are often
patently illegal, and mild resistance is not uncommon. Resistance, such
as going limp, is part of the effort to continue the lawful demonstra-
tion. Arrests under these circumstances may be highly provocative, but
provocation is not the issue here; reasonable resistance should be legit-
imated in order to protect the first amendment freedom. Were there
no right to resist such arrests, the resisting arrest statute would afford
the police an easy tool for curbing the exercise of first amendment
rights. Whenever a lawful arrest for demonstrating might be barred by
the first amendment, the simplest thing for the police to do would be
to arrest the demonstrators unlawfully. The demonstration would then
be terminated with little risk of consequences to the police; those who
resisted could be convicted of obstructing an officer, while those who
submitted would necessarily cease the conduct found offensive by the
authorities. As applied to warrantless arrests which patently violate
first amendment rights, therefore, any statute which limits the common
law right to resist should be held unconstitutional.
52. The leading English case, The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1297, 92 Eng. Rep.
349 (K.B. 1710), traced the right to the Magna Charta, see p. 1130 supra. Many American
authorities have assumed that the right is implied in the Constitution. See People v.
Raffery, 69 Ill. 111, 112 (1873); Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Ct. App. Mo.
1966); City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 14 So. 2d 781 (1943); City of Columbus v.
Holmes, 152 N.E.2d 301 (Franklin County Ct. App. Ohio 1958), afJ'd per curiam, 169
Ohio St. 251, 159 N.E.2d 232 (1959). The United States Supreme Court once said, in
dictum, that "one has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest." United States v.
DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948). See also John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529
(1900), which held that under common law the killing of a policeman in resistance to an
unlawful arrest could be manslaughter.
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Disobedience to an unlawful order. The Supreme Court has also
acknowledged that due process protects an individual from being
punished for violating an arbitrary police order.0 An arrest is closely
related to such an order-both are powers of the State to which an
individual must ordinarily submit. It might even be argued that an
arrest is an order to the defendant to submit himself to police custody.
If an individual cannot be convicted for not submitting to an illegal
order, he should not be convicted for not submitting to an illegal
arrest. The Supreme Court, however, has not fully explained how con-
viction for failing to obey an unlawful order violates due process; thus,
while the doctrine is a useful analogy to the situation of an unlawful
arrest, it does not definitively establish the right to resist.
Provocative arrests. Finally, and most importantly, due process should
not permit provocation by the police to be rewarded by a conviction
for resisting arrest. If the state's agent provokes an individual into
committing a crime, the state should not convict or punish him for
committing that crime. In some cases, provocation may constitute
entrapment. For the state to convict an individual for a crime which it
has provoked violates the fundamental fairness which due process is
designed to protect. Moreover, it encourages the police to engage in
offensive practices.
The right to resist may be viewed as a common law right as well
as a constitutional right. Until the Supreme Court carefully articulates
the constitutional dimensions, state courts and legislatures should
protect the common law right of a citizen to use reasonable resistance
when provoked by arbitrary authority.
In defining reasonable resistance, however, courts and legislatures
might be inclined to draw a distinction between resistance that is
passive and resistance that is affirmative. One might, for example, be
permitted to refuse the unlawful order of a policeman without being
permitted to use affirmative force in resistance. This may at first seem
an attractive balance betveen the important right to resist arbitrary
authority and the need to protect policemen from injury, but further
reflection will show that it is unworkable. In the first place, such a rule
conflicts with the present law of resisting or obstructing an officer. The
53. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 US. 87 (1965) (rcerecd conviction
for obstructing the sidewalk by refusing to move when so ordered); Wright v. Georgia.
873 U.S. 284 (1963) (reversed conviction for refusal to obey an order to leave a segregated
basketball court). Mr. Justice Douglas relied upon Wright in his dissenting opinion in
Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968).
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tendency of recent years has been to define any physical form of re-
fusal to submit, including sitting down or refusing to move, as "re-
sistance.154 If that were the only problem, an alluring solution might
be to hold that resisting arrest statutes cannot constitutionally be
applied to purely passive resistance to a patently unlawful arrest."
But a more serious difficulty is the problem of distinguishing passive
physical resistance from affirmative resistance. If the police attempt to
handcuff their prisoner, is he justified in pulling his wrists away or in
folding his arms? If the officer strikes him to make him submit, is he
justified in warding off the blows or trying to grasp the officer's arm?50
While the distinction between affirmative and passive resistance is
often blurred, courts have been able to determine rough standards for
measuring the reasonable use of force in resisting an unlawful arrest.
To take an example, the majority of American and English courts
have held that the use of a deadly weapon is unreasonable in resisting
a detention not itself accompanied by the use of deadly force, and that
an assault charge based upon the use of such a weapon is usually
valid.57 This rule sets an outer limit to the force which may be used
in resistance. The question at issue, whether the defendant had and
used a deadly weapon, is relatively concrete and easier to determine
than, for example, the question of whether the defendant merely
pushed the policeman or punched hin. 5
54. See In Re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966); People v. Crayton, 55
Misc. 2d 213, 284 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1967); People v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228
N.Y.S.2d 981 (Magis. Ct. 1963). See also Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by the
Offense of Obstructing a Public Officer, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1960).
55. Something of this rationale underlies District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1
(1950). See also Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by the Offense of Obstructing a
Public Officer, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 388 (1960); note 58 infra.
56. Most courts would probably hold that such resistance is justified on the theory
that a prisoner can lawfully use enough force to prevent himself from being injured
while being taken into custody. Note, Force That May Be Used to Resist an Unlawful
Arrest, 9 OKLA. L. REv. 60 (1956).
57. State v. Mox Mox, 28 Idaho 176, 152 P. 802 (1915); State v. Goering, 193 Kan. 307,
392 P.2d 930 (1964); People v. Briggs, 19 N.Y.2d 37, 224 N.E.2d 93, 277 N.Y.S.2d 662
(1966); State v. Gum, 68 W. Va. 105, 69 S.X. 463 (1910). But see Pickett v. State, 25 S.E.
608 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1896); Note, Force That May Be Used to Resist an Illegal Arrest, 9
OKLA. L. REV. 60 (1956).
58. This discussion is not intended to imply that the concept of passive resistance Is
not useful as a defense in those rare cases in which such resistance can actually be proved.
In New York, for example, the current state of the law lends itself to such a distinction.
The New York statute eliminating the right to resist an unlawful arrest states that "Ea]
person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized,
39 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.27 (McKinney Supp. 1968) (emphasis added). Curiously, the re-
sisting arrest statute penalizes only persons who resist an "unauthorized arrest," N.Y.
Penal Law § 205.30 (McKinney 1967). A lawful arrest is thus still an element of the crime
of resisting arrest and presumably one may not be convicted for resisting arrest without
the use of physical force if the arrest is unauthorized. The statute defining the crime of
assault does not mention authorized arrest. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00-120.35 (McKinney
1967). Presumably one may be convicted for resistance which amounts to assault, whether
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IV. Determining Provocation
If it is clear that reasonable resistance to unlawful arrest cannot be
limited to passive resistance, there is still the problem of defining and
explaining what kinds of unlawful arrests are so provocative that
resistance must be excused. The problem must be dealt with on
several levels, depending upon how patently unlawful the arrest is,
either by constitutional or by common law standards. Unlawful arrests
may be divided into three categories : (A) the easiest case, an arrest
that prevents a citizen from exercising his constitutional rights; (B)
unlawful arrests based upon conduct in the presence of the arresting
officer; and (C) unlawful arrests based on incidents not witnessed by
the arresting officer.
A. Infringement of Constitutional Rights
Resisting an unlawful arrest is often necessary to protect first amend-
ment rights, regardless of whether the resistance is provoked.50 But
any arrest which infringes on constitutional rights is likely to be
provocative by common law standards. For example, in a recent case
several Negroes were playing basketball on segregated public facilities,
and refused to leave the premises after being ordered to do so by the
police.60 Their subsequent arrest for disobeying the officers' order
deprived them of their right to equal protection of the law and would
have caused a great many defendants to offer some resistance.
Every false arrest raises a fourth amendment question because it is
by definition an unlawful "seizure." The impairment of fourth
amendment rights, however, is not enough to justify resistance to an
unlawful arrest. The problem is to determine the circumstances under
which such a seizure becomes so provocative as to make unfair the
imposition of a criminal penalty for resisting it. State courts have gen-
or not the arrest was authorized. The interrelation of these statutes has given rise to a
ruling that resistance to an unlawful arrest that does not amount to an assault may not
be penalized. People v. Walgren, No. 89744/68 (New York City Crim. Ct., Manhattan.
Part 2B3, April 14, 1969) (Midonick, J.). A similar reasoning was applied in California
in People v. Curtis, - Cal. -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33 (1969) to reduce a charge
from felony to misdemeanor assault, because the felony required assault on an officer in
the discharge of his duties. In Walgren the defendant "resisted" an unlawful arrest by escap-
ing from the officer's grasp and running away. The court acquitted him of the charge of
resisting arrest, saying that an interpretation of the law that would penalize such an
action would give rise to serious constitutional questions. This reasoning seems correct
as far as it goes. The problem is that the constitutional questions would be just as serious
if the officer's grasp had been firmer, and the defendant had pushed him in order to
make good his escape. Such are the tortured decisions produced by the effort to do justice
when the right to resist is abolished.
59. See p. 1188 supra.
60. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
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erally protected the right to resist an arrest resulting from an illegal
intrusion on one's real property with more tenderness than the right to
resist an unlawful arrest made in a public place. There is an extra
element of provocation when the police come onto a person's own land
for an unlawful purpose."' When the intrusion is accompanied by an
unlawful search, the courts are obliged to decide whether resistance is
an appropriate means for protecting federal constitutional rights.1
2
When the search is patently unlawful, the courts have protected the
right to resist,63 but when the officer possesses a warrant that is valid on
its face, resistance is generally not justified.
0
4
The recent decision in Terry v. Ohio6u complicates the determina-
tion of when a search is patently illegal. The Supreme Court held in
Terry that when a police officer has "reasonable suspicion" that an
individual has committed or is planning a serious crime, he may de-
tain that individual on the street for purposes of questioning and may
pat down the suspect's outer clothing to detect weapons. It is plain
that resistance to such a legitimate detention may be made a criminal
offense, 66 but the term "reasonable suspicion" is so vague that the
individual who is detained under a "stop and frisk" may not have a
clear idea whether the officer is justified in detaining him. Not know-
ing, for example, that the police are looking for some one of his
general description, he might resist detention when an officer stops
him for questioning even though the officer does have reasonable
suspicion.
It is too early yet to tell if Terry will make it more difficult to de-
termine whether provocation actually exists, but the problem really
stems from the vagueness of the Terry standard. Once judicial deci-
sions flesh out the standard, courts will be better able to distinguish
unlawful detentions, and individuals may have a better idea of when
a detention is legal. In the meantime there is some evidence that Terry
61. State v. Cesero, 146 Conn. 375, 151 A.2d 338 (1959); King v. State, 149 So. 2d 482
(Miss. 1963); Pettis v. State, 48 So. 2d 355 (Miss. 1950); Masden v. State, 244 S.W.2d 228
(Tex. 1951); State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658 (1845).
62. When an individual resists a search, he is, of course, not resisting an arrest. How-
ever the charge preferred against him will be very similar to resisting arrest, e.g., ob-
structing an officer.
63. Dovel v. United States, 299 F. 948 (7th Cir. 1924); Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262,
99 So. 548 (1924). Cf. Ex Parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D. Mont. 1920).
64. Cf. Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1937).
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
66. People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967), refused to
apply to such a detention the California statute abolishing the right to resist an unlawful
arrest. It does not follow that when such a detention is constitutionally permissible, re-
sistance is justified.
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will not have a great impact on the right to resist an unlawful arrest.
Temporary detention, even when unfounded, is not so provocative as
an arrest. Although no empirical research exists to verify the point,
in the author's experience, stop-and-frisks do not generally provoke
resistance. Furthermore, there must be some evidence for the officer to
rely on. Vague as the term "reasonable suspicion" is, the Supreme
Court6 7 and commentators"" have emphasized that the officer cannot
rely on subjective good faith, but must produce facts related to a
serious crime which bring about a reasonable inference warranting the
intrusion. Nevertheless, it will be possible, in some instances, for the
police successfully to charge an individual with resisting detention
instead of resisting arrest, because less evidence is required to detain.
Although it is difficult to delineate what is sufficient provoca-
tion to excuse an individual who resists a street detention, 0 certain
standards do exist. When the stop and frisk is shown to be a form of
harassment directed against a defendant or a group to which he be-
longs, it is a provocative detention. Thus, for example, there is pro-
vocation if the stop is part of a pattern of "aggressive patrol," involving
routine and random stops in a ghetto neighborhood, or if it is intended
simply to enforce the officer's authority with teenagers, "hippies," or
others in the neighborhood, or if it is only one of a series of fruitless
stops directed against the defendant.70
B. Face-to-Face Disputes7'
The paradigm case in which the right to resist unlawful arrest is an
issue is posed by a typical street incident: A policeman sees a group
of men on a corner and tells them to move on. One of them refuses,
and gives the policeman an argument. In order to maintain his au-
thority, the policeman arrests the man.72 Such arrests are not uncom-
67. Terry v. Ohio, 292 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
68. LaFave, Street Encounters and the Constitution, 67 Micn. L. Rtv. 39, 68.84 (1963).
The New York City Police Department requires the submission of a form, UF250 ex-
plaining the grounds for a stop.
69. LaFave argues that such resistance is never justified. Id. at 125 n.438.
70. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 14 n.11 (1968); P. CIMIGNY, PoucE Pov.ta, ch. 12
(1969).
71. In most cases, arrests for misdemeanors will result from face-to-face disputes. A
lawful arrest for a misdemeanor can generally be made without a warrant only if the
crime is committed in the presence of the officer or if the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that a crime is being committed in his presence. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF Cra.suNAL
PRocEmuS § 177(1) (NfcKinney 1960). A felony arrest may be made without a warrant
upon reliable information that a felony has been committed and that the defendant com-
mitted it. In practice most felony arrests do not stem from face-to-face confrontations
between the officer and the suspect.
72. Cf. Wimburley v. State, 30 Ala. App. 394, 6 So. 2d 524 (9.12); Finch v. State, 101 Ga.
App. 73, 112 S.E.2d 824 (1960).
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mon, especially in the cities where a great deal of police patrol consists
of "moving people along. ' 73 One study, for example, revealed that
over one-fifth of all the disorderly conduct arrests in the District of
Columbia resulted from words uttered to the officer alone." Investi-
gators for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice also found such practices to be very com-
mon. 5 One example-less confusing and acrimonious than most-
appears in the testimony of a police inspector concerning the arrest
of two teenagers for disorderly conduct:
Well, I had observed we had some trouble in the area and I was
down there. We had a detail along the Merrick Road trying to
break up these small clusters of young people that were around
on the Merrick Road and I observed Patrolman Johnson talking
to this group of boys that included these two defendants. He had
moved them from one place to another but they wouldn't leave
this particular shopping center. I went over to the boys and I
said: "Now you'll have to go home." And one boy, the Ortmann
boy, said: "We don't have to." I said, "You have to leave now
or you'll be arrested." He said: "Now, I want to talk to you." And
I said: "I don't want to talk about it. You have to leave." And
he repeated: "I want to talk to you." And I told Patrolman John-
son to take him in.
Q. What, if anything, did the defendant Pearsall say?
Well, while Patrolman Johnson was bringing the Ortmann boy
to the car I said to the group in general, "You'll have to break
it up and go home." And the Pearsall boy said: "I want to ask you
something." And I said: "I don't want to answer anything or
discuss anything, you must leave." And he said again: "I want to
ask you something." And I said: "Take him to the car." We
brought him into the stationhouse.76
73. Such cases are especially common in a populous state like New York. 
See, e.g.,
People v. Bomboy, 32 Misc. 2d 1002, 229 N.Y.S2d 323 (Sp. Sess. 1962); People v. 
La Sister,
9 Misc. 2d 518, 170 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sp. Sess. 1958); People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 
485, 163
N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957). Cf. People v. Gaskin, 305 N.Y. 837 (1954); People 
v. Dreares,
15 App. Div. 2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1961), aff'd 11 N.Y.2d 906 (1962).
74. Hoffman and Wald, Report on the Disorderly Conduct Statute of the 
Dist. of
Columbia (mimeograph, 1966).
75. PRES. COIMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TAsK FO RCE 
RE-
PORT ON THE POLICE, 179-180 (1967).
76. People v. Ortmann, No. 3108-3109168 (D.C. Nassau County, N.Y.) Pt. I1, 
Trial
Minutes 10/17/68. Defendants were acquitted of a charge of disorderly conduct 
under
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(6) (McKinney 1967):
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public 
Incon-
venience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: .. .He 
congre-
gates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful 
order
of the police to disperse.
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The defendants here did not resist, but in similar cases, a defendantmay pull his hands away from the handcuffs or push or hit the officer.In some cases, depending on the words used in the argument, thepersonality of the policeman, and the status of the defendant in thecommunity, the policeman may use force in the arrest even withoutany resistance. In these circumstances, the defendant is commonly
charged with breach of the peace as well as resisting arrest.
The important element in such cases is that the evidence for theunderlying arrest, the breach of the peace, is based upon a face-to-face
confrontation between the policeman and the citizen. The citizenknows perfectly well whether the arrest is false and arbitrary becausehe and the policeman have been present during every moment of theevent. Both parties know all there is to know about the case. At atrial on the underlying charge, the version of the facts given by thedefendant may be controverted by the policeman testifying to someactual disturbance of the peace. When the defendant's "day in court"is simply a swearing contest between the policeman and himself, thecourt will nearly always accept the policeman's version. But even if thejudge accepts the defendant's story and dismisses the underlying charge,the court could convict for resistance to the illegal arrest unless the
right to resistance is recognized.
There is a very practical consideration for permitting resistance toan unlawful arrest resulting from a face-to-face dispute. Defiance ofa policeman's unlawful order may provoke a blow as well as a falsearrest. The defendant's alleged "resistance" may be non-existent ordirected only to the use of excessive force. If there is no right toresist, a court cannot acquit on the resisting charge except by brandingthe policeman a liar. Where there is a right to resist, the factual ques-tion may be enveloped in the much easier question of the lawfulness ofthe arrest. More than eighty years ago, one court put it this way in a
jury charge:
The officer could arrest only for a breach of the peace actuallybeing committed in his presence and if you believe, from all theevidence in the case, that no such breach of the peace took placeuntil the arrest was made, and then only in resisting the arrest,
such resistance was justifiable.77
Of course, there is sometimes a dispute about the circumstances of
77. People v. Rounds, 67 Mich. 482, 35 N.W. 77 (1887). In this case the jury did notfind these to be the facts and convicted the defendant of obstructing an officer.
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the breach of the peace as well as of the resistance, but it is 
often easier
for the court to determine whether there has been an unlawful 
arrest,
instead of whether or not the police first used force, or used 
excessive
force. When reasonable resistance to an unlawful arrest 
is justified,
it may not be necessary to make the second determination 
at all.
What sort of "provocation" to resistance is made out 
by the actions
of the police in the paradigm, face-to-face case? 
The policeman has
initiated the situation, has confronted the citizen 
with an utterly
arbitrary order, and has enforced it by an act of 
coercion intended
primarily to maintain his authority. Such an arrest 
makes it difficult
for any person who values his liberty to submit. 
The intent of the
citizen in refusing to submit or in struggling is 
not criminal, but
rather an intent to protest an injustice and to 
reject an arbitrary
action. The resistance is an act which, but for the 
acts and encourage-
ment of the police, would never have 
occurred. Analytically, this
"provocation" has an effect similar to entrapment: The police have
caused a "crime," where none would otherwise 
have occurred, by a
"temptation" which the citizen should not be expected 
to resist, and
under circumstances where there is no real criminal 
intent. 8
This analysis points to a number of policies underlying 
the rule
permitting resistance to arbitrary arrest in face-to-face 
confrontations.
The rule, like the defense of entrapment, is partly 
intended to dis-
courage police abuses. There is always the possibility 
that a malicious
or ambitious policeman may be determined to convict 
a particular
individual. If the policeman cannot arrest the citizen 
in a lawful way,
he may do it in an arbitrary way. If he can provoke 
his victim to
resistance, he can obtain a conviction for the resistance, 
if not upon
the underlying charge. The more outrageous the 
arrest, the more
likely it is to provoke resistance and lead to a 
conviction; the fact
that there is no right to resist puts a premium 
on arbitrary police
action.
The courts and legislatures have had no difficulty 
with a policy
intended to discourage arbitrary police action. 
They have hesitated,
however, over whether it ought to be enforced 
by self-help in the
streets. As indicated above, that perspective distorts 
the problem; the
question really is whether such self-help ought 
to be made a crime.
If the provocation is enough to make a person 
who would not other-
78. See, e.g., Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W2d 
280 (Kan. City Ct. App. Mo. 1966).
Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
1146
Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest
wise commit a crime resist arrest, then there is only one possible
answer to the question.
The flaw in the statutes and court decisions which purport to abolish
the right to resist is that they create a situation where the citizen is
trapped by the legal system. If he obeys a patently arbitrary arrest,
he has submitted to oppression, and if he resists, he may be convicted
for his resistance. Surely there can be no more embittering experience
of the criminal process than such a conviction. The freedom to refuse
to obey a patently unlawful arrest is essential to the integrity of a gov-
ernment which purports to be one of laws, and not of men. Unless it
is desirable to kill the impulse to resist arbitrary authority, the rule
that such an arrest is a provocation to resist must remain funda-
mental.
C. Other Patently False Arrests
There are a number of cases in which the right to resist is less clear-
cut than in the face-to-face dispute, although there may still be con-
siderable provocation. The problem is to distinguish between provoca-
tive arrests and those which are merely technically defective. A by-
stander sometimes sees a face-to-face dispute developing, intervenes in
the illegal arrest, and is himself arrested and charged with obstructing
an officer. According to the traditional American rule, a third person
stands in the shoes of the person arrested, and can resist if the latter
might have done so.79 Logically the right to interfere should be limited
to persons who are actually privy to the circumstances out of which
the original arrest arose. Put another way, there is sufficient provoca-
tion if the bystander is provoked by the same acts as the person arrested.
An arrest made on the complaint of a third party presents greater
difficulty in justifying resistance. In most jurisdictions, a police officer
is not supposed to arrest for a misdemeanor unless he has reasonable
cause to believe he has seen the offense committed, 0 but officers some-
times make such arrests and often make arrests for felonies solely upon
the complaint of another citizen. Where the arrest is made on a third-
79. For the American rule, see Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403
(1865); People v. Papp, 185 N.Y.S.2d 907 (N.Y. County Ct. 1959). The English rule, as
originally expounded in The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1297, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B.
1710), seems now to be more like the rule advanced here. See pp. 1130-31 supra. The by-
stander sometimes gets into his own face-to-face dispute by his verbal protests to the
officer.
80. E-g., N.Y. CODE OF Caur. PROC. § 177 (McKinney 1960); see 39 U. of DEmorr UJ.
595 (1962).
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party complaint, the element of personal antagonism and deliberate
oppression is less likely to be involved, and such an arrest is thus
usually less provocative than an arrest where the officer himself is the
complainant.8' There is no hard and fast rule for arrests based on third-
party complaints, but there are several instances in which such arrests
will be sufficiently provocative to justify a right 
to resist.82
Lack of an underlying offense. If the officer charges the citizen with
acts which do not constitute an offense, then the officer himself should
realize that the arrest cannot be lawful. Despite his reliance on the
complaint of the third person, there will be considerable provocation.
These cases appeared frequently at common law."
3
Officer's knowledge that the complaint is false. When an officer
comes to make an arrest on the complaint of a third person and the
defendant presents evidence which would tend to show that the arrest
is unlawful, some provocation is engendered if the policeman proceeds
to arrest. This hypothetical case is not as fanciful as it may seem. When
making an arrest in which they have no direct interest, policemen
frequently tell the defendant the source of and reason for the complaint.
It is also common for the defendant to attempt to convince the officer
not to make the arrest. In City of Columbus v. Holmes,
84 when an
officer came to demand the complainant's car keys from the defendant,
defendant showed proof of ownership of the car. The officer ought to
have paused to consider the reasonableness, if not the legality, of an
arrest. Once a defendant has explained the illegality of the arrest, he
may be justifiably outraged if the officer persists in his course.
81. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A2d 428 (1965), which changcd 
the law
of resisting unlawful arrest in New Jersey, arose out of an arrest 
for selling liquor to a
minor in which the officer saw the minor with the liquor, but not 
the sale.
82. Courts have not always applied the rule of provocation to arrests 
based on third
party complaints. Some have instead applied a very mechanical 
rule; if the arrest is
illegal, resistance is justified. For example, in Commonwealth v. Carey, 
66 Mass. (12 Cusl)
246 (1853), a constable encountered the defendant near an office door 
that had been forced
open. He searched the defendant and found a chisel. When the officer 
then made an
arrest, the defendant attempted to escape, killing the constable in the process. 
The crime
of breaking an office door was not a felony, and because the constable 
had not seen tile
defendant commit it, Chief Justice Shaw instructed the jury that 
it could find man.
slaughter.
A similar result was reached in the case of State v. Robinson, 6 Ariz. App. 424, 
433 P.2d
75 (1967). The defendant was convicted of obstructing an 
officer when he resisted an
arrest for burglary. The appellate court reversed because the arrest was 
based entirely on
an anonymous telephone tip and was therefore illegal. The defendant 
was allowed to
resist regardless of whether or not he was provoked. Decisions 
such as these, which
ignore the key factor of provocation, are one cause of the recent 
unpopularity of the
right to resist an unlawful arrest.
83. See notes 13 and 14 supra. See also City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 
La. 974, 14 So. 2d
781 (1943).
84. 152 N.E.2d 301 (Franklin County Ct., Ohio 1958), aff'd, 
169 Ohio St. 251, 159
N.E.2d 232 (1959).
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Personal animosity. Policemen sometimes threaten to "get" a de-
fendant, and they may use the complaint of a third party as a pretext.
If the arrest is unlawful, a personal element makes it doubly pro-
vocative, and suggests that the police may have entrapped the resisting
defendant into a crime he would not otherwise have committed.
Repeated arrests. Repeated false arrests, especially after the victim
has once been found innocent, are especially provocative. There is
an implied element of personal revenge, and a suggestion that the
officer has made the arrest knowing it to be illegal. Repeated false
arrests may well lure the defendant into resistance. 85 For example, the
author defended two young men who had been arrested for stealing
candy from a concessionnaire and then released after the police found
that they had paid for the candy. The concessionnaire was incensed
by their rude behavior, and persuaded the police to pursue and arrest
them. Having once released them because the facts demonstrated their
innocence, it was highly provocative to rearrest them.8 0 The use of
raids or dragnet arrests against a whole class of supposed undesirables
presents a similar case. This kind of action is taken by the authorities
with disturbing frequency, often with the support of elected officials,
as a method of systematic harassment without a pretense of probable
cause. A notorious example is the wave of police repression against
radicals following the "Palmer Raids" of 1919-20. One federal judge
remarked that "the inalienable right and law of self-defense justified
resistance to the last dread extremity."8 7
All of the above cases, in which arrest was made without a warrant
on the complaint of a third person have some elements in common. In
each, the officer has good reason to know both that the arrest is unlaw-
ful. and that the defendant is likely to be provoked by it. In the interest
of discouraging the practice of manufacturing a conviction by luring a
defendant into resistance--creating a crime which would not otherwise
occur-reasonable resistance to such an arrest should be excused.
Written process. Traditionally resistance to unlawful arrest was part
of the broader problem of resistance to legal process in general.8 9 It
85. Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (Kan. City Ct. App. Mo. 1966) (repeated
false arrest on a charge of being a known prostitute; last time around, the defendant re-
sisted).
86. People v. Williams, No. B10274-76/68 (Crim. CL of the City of New York, Man-
hattan). This case was decided after the "no sock" law, supra note 31, was passed. The
acquittal of the crime of resisting arrest was based on the court's acceptance of the argu-
ment that non-violent resistance (pulling away) to an obviously unlawful arrest was not
forbidden by the statute.
87. Ex Parte Jackson, 263 F. 110, 111 (D. Mont. 1920). For more recent e.xamples, see
P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowEn, Ch. 12 (1969).
88. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1146 (1966).
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is questionable today if resistance to written process may ever be justi-
fied. 9 Process issued by a court stands in a fundamentally different
position from a police order. In a few cases, however, the common
law seems to have recognized the right to resist, as in the case of an
obviously fraudulent warrant, such as a warrant filled in by the police,
0
or as in the case of an arrest warrant which does not describe any de-
fendant, or a search warrant which does not describe the premises
to be searched. 91 These are cases in which the process is not gen-
uinely that of a court or in which neither the officer nor the defendant
could believe that the process was proper. They cover the few cases in
which officers may use unauthorized written process for oppressive
purposes. The interest in enforcing such process is minimal, the abuse
great, and the provocation great as well. Apart from these cases, it
appears that an individual must comply with the process and resort to
the courts to attack it.
Undoubtedly, it is sometimes difficult to determine when the right
to resist an unlawful arrest exists. The task is not impossible, however,
and it is certainly consistent with fundamental fairness to excuse
persons who are provoked to reasonable resistance by oppressive and
unlawful state action. The purpose of the right is not to encourage
violent attacks on policemen, but to preserve the sense of personal
liberty inherent in the right to reject arbitrary orders. To permit the
police to provoke individuals into committing the crime of resisting
arrest, creates a trap for citizens which must, in the long run, injure the
integrity of the legal system.
89. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), which holds that an injunc-
tion which is not transparently invalid must be obeyed until it is struck down by a court.
90. E.g., Rafferty v. People, 69 Ill. Ill (1873). However, in Raflerly the court again
applied the mechanical rule that an illegal arrest justifies resistance; there was no 
showing
that the defendant knew that the warrant was false.
91. E.g., Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403 (1865), where a magistrate
issued a warrant for the arrest of "John Doe or Richard Roe" bearing no address, 
de-
scription or any other information about the defendant. See also Jackson v. State, 
87
Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924).
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